-Sun Tzu
Since winning World War II, and despite decades of U.S. hegemony, we must acknowledge an ironic and disturbing trend: America is winning battles, but losing wars. While these strategic losses may be the collective fault of many, our oath as U.S. military officers requires us to act boldly to reverse this trend. If we do not act, America may lose again or forfeit her power to influence global affairs and deter potential enemies. This strategic research paper analyzes the disturbing trend in our conduct of warfare since 1945, explores its causes, and endeavors to answer two critical questions: Why are we losing wars? And, how can we reverse this trend? Both the reasons for our losses and potential solutions should emerge during the course of this analysis. Finally, to enable these solutions we must require America's strategic leaders to renew their oaths and courageously reclaim their proper place in shaping America's strategic discourse. Thus, we can return victory as America's standard and constant in war.
Reflecting on our recent wars from the strategic perspective offered during instruction at the U.S. Army War College, one can identify several reasons for our losses. And, as we will identify in the conclusion, a consistent theme developed as research progressed on this project.
For decades, our nation's leaders have not specified victory through a well-defined end state as our supreme objective in every conflict; this was especially true in Korea and Vietnam. We have also failed to communicate the intent of our military operations (purpose, method, and end state) to our own nation. This has weakened public support and has made it difficult to engage and coordinate the elements of power within our government. We can also place significant blame directly on the American Congress. Far from being the noble and patriotic body our forefathers envisioned, they have avoided declaring war and have instead engaged in partisan politics and infighting, thereby reducing the legitimacy of our efforts and strengthening the ideology and determination of our enemies. Our most senior military officers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), are not without fault. Perhaps in response to pressure from politicians and political appointees, they have increasingly focused on budgetary concerns and publishing enormous libraries of doctrine and vision statements rather than acting as our senior warriors.
As our generals have become more political, those who have reigned as Secretary of Defense (SecDEF) have become increasingly operational. Thus, we have allowed an inappropriate shift of primary responsibilities within the Department of Defense (DoD), while ignoring the successful historical precedent of professional warriors leading war efforts.
Understanding this particular problem is crucial to understanding our losses and America's general strategic meandering. Along with this erroneous shift of responsibilities born after WWII came equally flawed strategies, such as limited war and incremental force build-ups.
Furthermore, our SecDEFs have grown independent of the rest of the President's Cabinet, leaving huge gaps in interagency coordination and disregarding the Diplomatic-InformationalMilitary-Economic (DIME) 2 construct of applying elements of national power in combination. Furthermore, a careful analysis of conflicts that most would categorize as 'successful' such as the European Theater of WWII and Desert Storm, had end states that were rather ominous.
Certainly, we can all agree that strategic victory in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), despite resounding tactical triumphs, is not assured. Therefore, it is vital to perform a critical analysis to determine the causes for our past failures. Then, we must implore our strategic leaders to apply these lessons to achieve victory in the GWOT and beyond. Let us first consider the WWII Pacific Theater and the defeat of Japan. In this case, we irrefutably won a classic victory, albeit at a tremendous cost. Why did we win? We were attacked and we were angry (similar to the immediate response after 9/11). But immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the President asked for a formal declaration of war against Japan. A patriotic and dutiful Congress delivered. We then engaged in a determined strategy and used all of our military might, as well as other elements of national power, to achieve victory. Essentially, we were determined to achieve victory. This primary objective was not questioned by U.S. citizens, elected officials, or appointed officials. Total victory, including a formal unconditional surrender, was the only end state our citizens would accept and we acted as a nation to achieve it. Our unlimited use of national power, which necessitated garnering the public will, served to ultimately defeat Japan. And we should remember that although Japan was physically a much smaller country than the United States, it was a world-leading industrial and military power in 1941. We also had to extend our military forces over great distances in our fight to reclaim the Pacific. The positive effects of waging total war against Japan continue to this day; this absolute victory should remain as the strategic example of how to wage war.
Indeed, a study of conflicts, including WWII, show that the Pacific Campaign and the resulting total victory over Japan marks the high tide of U.S. strategy and courageous U.S. leadership.
But we did not achieve the same strategically sound end state in Europe, so we still suffer for mistakes made at or near the end of the European Campaign. While lessons from WWII or any other war cannot provide a complete template for strategic solutions, national leaders and senior military officers have the responsibility of understanding and applying both positive and negative lessons paid for in blood. Today, our current operations in Iraq seem to be begging for the direct application of lessons from our wars with Japan, Germany, and others. We have been taught at all levels of leadership that solutions should include in part, the simple but vitally important steps of acquiring and applying historical knowledge, especially as it pertains to occupying and governing a former enemy nation.
Unfortunately, we committed even more heinous strategic errors soon after WWII. These occurred in Korea, Vietnam, and in the Middle East, with grievous consequences to America.
Korea-Limited War = Limited Failure
During the Korean War, we suffered 36,934 dead and 103,284 wounded Americans. 10 The results included no change in borders and a more hardened communist regime. North Korea, known since 1948 as The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), eventually built and proliferated nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, and related technology. This end state did not spell success. The situation that exists along the border of the Koreas has continuously degraded for over fifty years, as the adversaries stare idiotically at each other across the fences at P'anmunjŏm. To add international illegitimacy to this situation, the Korean 'cease-fire' is a United Nations sanctioned and supported activity, leaving the U.S., South Korea, and other U.N. member nations stymied by one of the weakest nations on Earth.
The stalemate accepted in Korea was supposedly accepted because of a perennial fear of China. However, this reasoning does not seem to be valid when studied in historical context. In the 1950's China was still a limited power with several reasons to avoid full-scale confrontation with the U.S. Also, Japan proved that China could be defeated militarily with less power (and greater resolve?) than the U.S. possessed. In Korea, the U.S. limited strategic bombing even after Chinese intervention and capitalized only on the tactical capability of our air-to-air fighter pilots. On the ground, we made some of the boldest moves in history including maneuvers such as the Inchon Landing, proposed and planned by General Douglas MacArthur. 11 But it seemed that only MacArthur, who had led the defeat of a tenacious Japan, was not afraid of China. To MacArthur, limited war leading to an emboldened China would be detrimental to America's future.
General MacArthur was adamant in demanding total victory in Korea while U.S. political leadership and the JCS were intent on only restoring Korea's pre-war borders. He thus became the main subject in a lesson-rich episode involving both civil-military relations and national strategy. In early 1951, MacArthur made it clear that he did not agree with the U.S.
administration's policy of using limited war. In fact, MacArthur suggested that we push the Chinese back across the Yalu and beyond. After a series of successful offensive battles in early 1951, he believed that we could achieve total victory over the Chinese. 12 MacArthur wanted to 
Vietnam-How Not to Fight a War
Again, we draw from the words of Sun Tzu: "There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited." 15 The results of Vietnam were even more disheartening than those of Korea. Vietnam losses included more than 58,000 dead, 300,000 wounded, and 2000 missing in action. Also, an estimated 20,000 have committed suicide since coming home to America. 16 Furthermore, our departure was immediately followed by a communist takeover of our former ally. The only lessons we can gain from looking at Vietnam are those that dictate how not to wage war. Vietnam qualifies as a catastrophic loss by any standard. So whose fault was this? Our complete failure in Vietnam can be credited to our country's elite at that time:
Our presidents and their administrations, our Secretaries of Defense, the U.S. Congress, and most unforgivably, our generals. It has long seemed to me that the hard decisions are not the ones you make in the heat of battle. Far harder to make are those involved in speaking your mind about some hair-brained scheme which proposes to commit troops to action under conditions where failure seems almost certain, and the only results will be the needless sacrifice of priceless lives. When all is said and done, the most precious asset any nation has is its youth, and for a battle commander ever to condone the unnecessary sacrifice of his men is inexcusable. In any plan you must balance the inevitable cost in lives against the objectives you seek to attain. Unless the results to be expected can reasonably justify the estimated loss of life the action involves, then for my part I want none of it. 26 Public trust in the American political and military leadership was thus eroded for decades to The public has never had a deep understanding of WHY we were at war, especially concerning Iraq. President Bush should be commended for developing the well-founded strategy of eliminating a dangerous dictator and a safe-haven for terrorists, driving a geopolitical wedge between Iran and Syria, and promoting democracy and freedom in the Middle East.
However, the general lack of understanding among the American public is chiefly the fault of our administration. Americans need to understand the ends, ways, and means of war strategy before they will fully support it. Although we have enjoyed many great successes and have made prodigious strategic moves, GWOT suffers from a historic lack of nationalism, a recent lack of resolve, and poor strategic communication. Unfortunately, GWOT also suffers from the trend of convoluted civil-military relationships, which have pervaded the DoD since WWII.
Adding to the difficulty of winning against a seemingly bottomless insurgency, decades of pompous reign by defense secretaries has effectively shackled our military leaders. Most He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious. A sovereign of high character and intelligence must be able to know the right man, should place the responsibility on him, and expect results. 38 Subjects such as budgets, policy, and manpower should be the purview of our Secretaries of Defense, rather than operational strategy. However, since WWII, they have pushed our Joint Chiefs aside and have overridden and manipulated combatant commanders. Case in point:
OIF.
In Cobra II I … do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same… So help me God … everything except allowing our generals to do their job. Our country has suffered greatly for it and our generals must demand better than the reactive environment they are currently forced to endure.
America's political environment, in combination with idealistic and isolationist tendencies, have also helped lead us down the path of failure at the strategic level of war. Congressional members and media pundits talk exhaustively about globalism, global markets, and global
connectivity. Yet we attempt to wish global problems away in some unrealistic fantasy that evil forces will somehow forget about us. This is the case despite the attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941, despite decades of terrorist attacks on American people and assets worldwide, and despite the attack on New York City and the Pentagon in 2001. Furthermore, while we possess overwhelming power, we fail to gain an understanding (not sympathy) of our enemy's culture, objectives, fortitude, or patience. But our enemies get it-they study our pattern of warfare and politics while we impress ourselves with our tremendous array of capabilities. Then, repeatedly disregarding historical lessons, we challenge ourselves to adapt to the enemy's form of warfare.
Vietnam may have been a worse example of fighting symmetrically, but operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan share certain similar strategic and operational issues: we are not 'sealing the problem' by cutting off logistics and securing the borders and we are not effectively communicating our cause at home and abroad. President George W. Bush has had great difficulty recently pushing for even a modest increase in the number of soldiers for OIF. We should be able to communicate that these additional soldiers will enable faster training for Iraqi units while also providing greater mutual support for our own troops, thus saving American and Iraqi lives. America can and must win in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the wider GWOT. Our security and our way of life have never been more threatened. In fact, we may have upon us the greatest strategic and military challenge since our nation's founding.
We must also look beyond GWOT to other potential challenges. A growing China, an increasingly desperate Russia, or a coalition of equally desperate and adventurous South
American dictators could present a serious challenge to American values and interests. Yet strangely, our service chiefs speak of draw-downs of personnel and 'transformation' to a predominately expeditionary 43 force. Relying too heavily on expeditionary forces looms as an enormous strategic error. To avoid failure on a truly global scale, we must develop a meaningful strategy which acknowledges global challenges. This should include retaining and expanding permanent bases in key regions/countries throughout the world to shape and influence allies as well as potential enemies. In today's globally connected environment, forward presence, cultural understanding, and ready forces, led by informed and courageous leaders, are essential.
Achieving Strategic Victory-Leadership, Common Sense, and Courage
It is important to define 'victory' so that we can more easily determine solutions which will achieve it. It will suffice to define victory as: this premise a victorious plan will naturally follow. This plan must include: applying historical lessons, knowing the enemy, planning for victory, and using all elements of power in combination. These are concepts we teach our military officers, but they are not taught to those who are appointed to run our cabinets or those who are elected to Congress.
Common sense is difficult to teach, but sensible strategic concepts can be taught. All senior officials, especially new cabinet and congressional members, should accept a course in strategic leadership and military history. This course would include a brief on strategic warfare concepts, selected historical campaigns, examples of great strategic leadership, the cost of past wars in lives and dollars, and the cost of not acting or acting too late (e.g. allowing events which led to WWI, WWII, etc.). A conceptual strategic checklist for entering war should also be part of this training and should include the following considerations:
• CAUSE-worth dying for
• SITUATION-profoundly affects U.S. values and interests such as security, humanity, stability, resources
• ENDS/OBJECTIVES-includes a well defined end state which includes victory
• WAYS (our generals' responsibility to provide)-acceptable
• MEANS (forces, equipment, capital)-available
• NATION-informed, support garnered, updated regularly on strategy and status
• CONGRESS-war declared and vote recorded, published and supported
• ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER-all elements considered and enabled, then coordinated
• STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION-initiated and continuous
Both civilian and senior military leaders could also benefit by reviewing the salient issues forwarded in Joint Publication 3-0 46 and Joint Publication 5-0. 47 Much useful information is included in these publications, but a concerned strategic leader should add the following considerations:
• Historical Precedence/Lessons-observed and applied
• Intelligence, including analysis of enemy culture and capability-gathered and applied
• Initial Plan-vetted with operational experience and intelligence in an open and honest round-table environment; employs staff, interagency, and independent groups; encourages critical and creative thinking; considers all phases of the conflict
• Risks-identified and mitigated or accepted
• Final Plan-achieves victory with both strategic and operational end states
• Concept or Method-simple, flexible; considers all elements of U.S./allied power; maximizes friendly power and minimizes friendly losses; uses but does not violate principles of war; not limited (in means necessary), proportional or symmetric
• Guidance-useful and simple; defines purpose, method and a well-defined end state; appropriately specific; well distributed
• Operational Strategy-supportive of national strategy and reviewed/revisited often, especially since the enemy and our citizens also get a vote
The above warfare considerations may seem simplistic, but strategic leaders must internalize these concepts because when it comes to war, their application will mean the difference between victory and defeat. Perhaps during war, posters with these strategic considerations should stand prominently in the chambers of Congress and in the offices of our country's top decision-makers. Arms." 48 Human nature inclines us to agree, but our military mission demands absolute integrity. We must enforce discipline, but we must also embrace professional divergence, especially when we are considering strategic decisions that affect our nation's future and our warriors' lives. If we fail to create an environment of integrity and service, we will encourage sheep herding rather than harnessing stallions to produce leaders. The bottom line: our senior military leaders must change the subdued intellectual environment that pervades our profession, respect professional divergence, and promote stallions instead of sheep.
Where is America's contemporary George Marshall, Matthew Ridgway, Billy Mitchell, or Sun Tzu? We must encourage… demand… critical and creative thought and we must respect the time it takes to develop a successful strategy. We must facilitate the repair of our inappropriate relationships and skewed responsibilities within DoD and between DoD and
Congress. And we must lead the way in acting as a nation. Though our historical strategic losses may be the collective fault of many, we must understand and accept the challenges to our nation, renew our constitutional oaths, and boldly reclaim our proper place in shaping America's strategic discourse. Accepting and overcoming these challenges will lead to strategic victory for the United States of America.
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